Financial advisers: what the evidence shows — ROR Labs cover showing 1 in 13 had a record.
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Financial Advisers: What the Evidence Shows

Key takeaways · 12 min read

  • Roughly 7% of US advisers had a misconduct record; past offenders were five times as likely to offend again.
  • Within a year, almost half of the advisers who left after misconduct had found another job in the industry.
  • Mystery shoppers holding low-cost index portfolios were told to change strategy 85% of the time.
  • In Canada, clients paid more than 2.5% a year for advice shaped more by the adviser than by the client.

Most people who hand their savings to a financial adviser are buying two things: expertise they lack, and someone to trust with decisions they would rather not make alone. Both can be worth paying for. Advice is also a business, though, and the adviser is often paid in ways that depend on what the client buys.

How that worked out for clients was long a matter of opinion. Over the past fifteen years, economists have measured it. They have used regulators’ complete records of adviser misconduct, sent trained mystery shoppers to advisers’ offices, and followed hundreds of thousands of advised clients and the advisers’ own personal accounts.

Neither the industry nor its critics usually admits how mixed the results are. Misconduct is concentrated among a minority who often keep working. Advice is expensive and surprisingly uniform. Yet for some people, advice still leaves them better off than going it alone. This article sets out what the evidence shows.

A pointillist illustration: a meeting room with two people seated at either end of a long desk, brochures and an amber folder between them, a city window behind.
A meeting with an adviser. Researchers have now measured what these meetings produce.

How common misconduct is

Every registered broker in the United States has a public record on FINRA’s BrokerCheck system. In 2019, Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru published an analysis in the Journal of Political Economy of all of those records from 2005 to 2015, about 1.2 million people. Six types of disclosure counted as misconduct, including settled customer complaints, arbitration awards against the adviser, regulatory and criminal actions, and being let go after allegations.

By that definition, 7.28% of advisers had at least one misconduct record, about one in thirteen. At some of the largest firms the share was above 15%, and in parts of Florida and California about one in five advisers had a record. Misconduct rates were 19% higher in counties with below-average income and education, where clients may be least able to check.

The median settlement or award was $40,000 and the mean about $550,000; the total came to close to half a billion dollars a year. About one in four complaints alleged unsuitable investments, and about a third alleged misrepresentation or omission.

Repeat offenders keep working

What happened next was the most striking finding. Advisers with past misconduct were five times as likely as the average adviser to commit new misconduct, even compared with colleagues at the same firm in the same county and year. After a record, the chance of another was 11% in the first year, about 4% by the fifth and 1.5% by the ninth, against an annual rate of about 0.6% for advisers overall.

The risk of a new misconduct record

Annual probability of a new misconduct disclosure for US advisers, by years since a previous one.

One year after misconduct11%
Five years after4%
Nine years after1.5%
All advisers, any year0.6%

Egan, Matvos and Seru, Journal of Political Economy, 2019. FINRA BrokerCheck records, 2005–2015.

Firms did react: 48% of advisers had left their firm within a year of misconduct, against 19% of others. Yet 44% of those who left found a new job in the industry within a year, usually at firms that paid less and employed more advisers with records of their own, a pattern the authors called matching on misconduct. A 2024 follow-up by the same authors reported that publicly identifying the firms with the highest misconduct rates was associated with a drop of about 10% in misconduct.

A 2022 paper titled ‘When Harry Fired Sally’ from the same team found that after misconduct, female advisers were 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to be rehired than male advisers, a gap that shrank at firms with more women in management.

What happens after misconduct

US advisers with a misconduct record, 2005–2015.

48%left their firm within a year, against 19% of other advisers
44%of those who left were working at another firm within a year

Egan, Matvos and Seru, Journal of Political Economy, 2019.

What advisers recommend

A pointillist illustration: a signed contract on an amber folder with a pen resting across the signature line.
A signed agreement. How an adviser is paid shapes what gets recommended.

Misconduct is the extreme case; the more common question is whether ordinary advice is good. In 2008, Sendhil Mullainathan, Markus Noeth and Antoinette Schoar sent trained mystery shoppers on 284 visits to financial advisers. Each shopper described one of four existing portfolios: one chasing a sector that had just done well, one heavy in their employer’s shares, a diversified low-fee index portfolio, or all cash.

Advisers recommended actively managed funds in about half of the visits and index funds in only 7%. Shoppers who arrived with the low-cost index portfolio were told to change strategy 85% of the time, more often than those chasing past returns (59%). Advisers supported the index portfolio in only 2.4% of visits. The authors noted a possible reason besides commissions: advisers may feel they must recommend something different to show that they add value.

Mystery shoppers and the advice they received

284 audit visits to US financial advisers, 2008.

Index portfolio: told to change strategy85%
Return-chasing portfolio: told to change59%
Index portfolio: adviser supported it2.4%

Mullainathan, Noeth and Schoar, NBER Working Paper 17929, 2012. About 45% of visits produced no specific allocation advice.

Other studies point the same way. A 2009 paper by Daniel Bergstresser, John Chalmers and Peter Tufano found that US mutual funds sold through brokers from 1996 to 2004 delivered lower risk-adjusted returns than funds bought directly, even before distribution fees, though the authors were careful to say that brokers might provide benefits the data could not see. In a 2019 study of structured bonds called reverse convertibles, Mark Egan found cheaper and more expensive versions of essentially identical products sold side by side; customers often bought the worse ones, and brokers typically earned about twice the fees on them.

The price of advice

The most detailed evidence on cost comes from Canada. Stephen Foerster, Juhani Linnainmaa, Brian Melzer and Alessandro Previtero studied 581,044 clients of 5,920 advisers at three dealers from 1999 to 2012, in work published in the Journal of Finance in 2017. Advised clients paid more than 2.5% a year in fees, roughly the entire equity premium that investors hope to earn for taking stock-market risk.

Client characteristics explained little of what advisers recommended. A wide set of them, including risk tolerance, age and investment horizon, explained only 13% of the variation in how much clients held in risky assets, while which adviser they happened to have explained a further 20%. Moving from an adviser at the 25th percentile to one at the 75th meant about 20 percentage points more in risky assets, regardless of who the client was.

A 2021 follow-up by Linnainmaa, Melzer and Previtero asked whether this was a conflict of interest or something else, and looked at the advisers’ own portfolios. The advisers traded often, chased returns, preferred expensive active funds and were poorly diversified, just as their clients were. Their own net returns ran about 3% a year below the benchmark, and they kept holding expensive portfolios after they left the industry. The authors concluded that many advisers sincerely believed in the strategies they sold.

What the studies of advice cost and quality found

Selected findings from large studies of retail advice.

StudySettingFinding
Foerster and others, 2017581,044 Canadian clientsFees above 2.5% a year; adviser identity mattered more than client traits
Linnainmaa and others, 2021Advisers’ own accountsAbout −3% a year net; same habits as clients
Bergstresser and others, 2009US mutual funds, 1996–2004Broker-sold funds underperformed direct-sold funds
Chalmers and Reuter, 2020Oregon university pension planTarget-date funds beat broker-advised portfolios on risk-adjusted return

Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies and Journal of Financial Economics. Canadian and US data.

In 2015 the White House Council of Economic Advisers estimated that conflicted advice cost American retirement savers about 1 percentage point a year, or about $17 billion a year across $1.7 trillion of affected savings. Estimates of the total cost are contested: industry economists argued that the report leaned on small studies and ignored the benefits of broker services. The council itself noted that even half that effect would cost savers more than $8 billion a year.

The case for advice

Advice is not worthless. Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny argued in a 2015 paper called ‘Money Doctors’ that people pay for trust as well as expertise. Trust lets anxious investors take risks they would otherwise avoid, so even an adviser who underperforms the market after fees can leave a client better off than keeping everything in cash. Foerster’s team found exactly that effect: taking on an adviser raised clients’ share of risky assets by about 30 percentage points.

What matters is what the client would do otherwise. John Chalmers and Jonathan Reuter studied an Oregon university pension plan that removed its brokers and added target-date funds. Brokers had helped participants hold market risk but steered them to higher-commission options. Afterwards, similar new members mostly chose target-date funds, with similar risk and better risk-adjusted returns. Conflicted advice beat no advice only when there was no good default.

Some investors gain from automated advice. Francesco D’Acunto, Nagpurnanand Prabhala and Alberto Rossi studied a robo-adviser launched by an Indian brokerage in 2015. Clients who held fewer than five stocks became more diversified and performed better, and a common bias, selling winners too early while holding on to losers, fell by about 30%. Clients who were already diversified traded more and gained nothing. A 2024 paper by Jonathan Reuter and Antoinette Schoar argued that households with low financial literacy gain most from advice, even conflicted advice, and are also least able to spot misconduct.

What the records cannot show

Misconduct records can be wrong in both directions. Egan and colleagues excluded pending, denied and withdrawn complaints, so their measure is conservative, and they found pending complaints themselves predicted misconduct. Against that, a settlement is not proof of wrongdoing, and advisers can apply to have records removed. FINRA calls this expungement an extraordinary remedy and tightened its rules in October 2023.

A formal fiduciary duty is no guarantee either. The 2019 study found the same misconduct patterns among registered investment advisers, who owe clients a fiduciary duty, as among brokers, and its authors concluded that holding all advisers to a fiduciary standard might not be enough to deal with misconduct.

What regulators have done

US rules have moved back and forth. The SEC’s Regulation Best Interest, in effect since 30 June 2020, requires brokers to act in a retail client’s best interest when recommending investments and comes with a short relationship summary called Form CRS. A federal appeals court struck down the Department of Labor’s 2016 fiduciary rule for retirement advice in March 2018. Its 2024 replacement was blocked by Texas courts in July 2024 and formally vacated, and in March 2026 the Labor Department announced that it had no current plans for new rules.

The United Kingdom went further: its Retail Distribution Review banned commissions on investment advice in 2013. An early review for the regulator found fewer sales of products that had paid high commissions, but people with small sums found advice harder to get. Only 9% of UK adults received regulated advice in the year to May 2024, and a new, lighter form of targeted support began in April 2026.

Rules on advice since 2012

Main changes in the United States and the United Kingdom.

DateWhereWhat changed
Dec 2012UKCommissions on investment advice banned
Mar 2018USLabor Department’s 2016 fiduciary rule struck down on appeal
Jun 2020USSEC Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS apply
Jul 2024USLabor Department’s 2024 Retirement Security Rule blocked by courts
Mar 2026USThat rule formally vacated; no new rules planned
Apr 2026UKNew targeted support regime begins

SEC, US Department of Labor, Financial Conduct Authority. UK advice-gap figures reported via an FCA-cited summary.

A pointillist illustration: an office waiting room with a row of blue chairs, one person waiting, a frosted glass door and an amber table lamp.
A waiting room. Records of misconduct are public, but few clients look them up.

Recent cases

FINRA reported 625 new disciplinary actions in 2025, with $99.6 million in fines and 187 individuals barred from the industry. In January 2025, the SEC settled charges against Wells Fargo and Merrill Lynch over cash sweep programmes in advisory accounts, which were often the only cash option offered and paid far less than alternatives as interest rates rose; penalties totalled $60 million. In August 2025, Vanguard’s advisory arm paid $19.5 million to settle charges that it had failed to disclose properly how its advisers were paid for enrolling and keeping clients. The firms settled without admitting or denying the findings.

For anyone choosing an adviser, the research points to four questions: how is this person paid, and does it depend on what I buy; what does their public record show; what would I do without advice; and what does the total annual cost add up to? Those costs compound in the same way as the returns we described in our article on sequence-of-returns risk.

Before you hire one: checking an adviser, step by step

Misconduct records exist and can be looked up. This section gives the checking sequence from the SEC’s Investor.gov pages, plus the one document every firm must hand you.

The checks, in order
StepWhat to do
1Search the person and the firm in the Investment Adviser Public Disclosure database (IAPD, adviserinfo.sec.gov), reached from Investor.gov’s “Check Out Your Investment Professional”
2Confirm registration: with the SEC, a state, and/or FINRA
3Read the disciplinary history for both the person and the firm; IAPD also shows employment history
4For a broker, also use FINRA BrokerCheck (brokercheck.finra.org)
5Check with your state securities regulator (directory at nasaa.org)
6Check any professional designations in FINRA’s designations database
7If it is a brokerage, confirm membership of SIPC
8Read the firm’s Form ADV brochure and its Form CRS

Form CRS. Also called Form ADV Part 3 or the relationship summary, it must be given to retail investors by both brokers and advisers. In two pages (four for a firm that is both), it covers services, fees and costs, conflicts of interest, standard of conduct, and legal and disciplinary history. The form’s own conversation starters include: Should I use a brokerage service, an advisory service or both? How will you choose the investments you recommend? What is your experience and what do your licences mean? If I invest $10,000, how much goes to fees? How do your conflicts of interest affect me? Do you have disciplinary history?

Broker or adviser? Investor.gov says brokers mainly handle transactions and recommendations and are typically paid commissions or markups, while advisers give ongoing advice and are typically paid a fee based on assets. Many firms are both, so ask which role the person is acting in at that moment.

Form ADV Part 2. Part 2A is the firm brochure, with 18 items in a fixed order, updated yearly; read it for fees, compensation, conflicts and disciplinary information, where events in the last 10 years are presumed material. Part 2B covers the individual adviser: education, experience, outside business activities, supervision and discipline. IAPD keeps records of firms no longer registered for 10 years.

What we could not confirm. The Investor.gov pages we read do not describe the standard of conduct for brokers (Regulation Best Interest); that description comes only from a July 2019 speech by the then SEC Chairman, so we have not relied on it here. The main Investor.gov check-out pages carry no date, and one older SEC page on checking professionals did not load.

What to do

These are checks, not recommendations of any adviser. Steps sorted by when they matter. Each one says how strong the evidence is: Measured Official advice Untested

Before

  • Look up an adviser’s public misconduct record before you hire them. The records are public, but few clients check. Official advice see Sources
  • Treat pending complaints as information too. They predicted later misconduct. Measured see Sources
  • In the US, ask for the Form CRS relationship summary. Official advice see Sources

What not to do

  • Do not take a fiduciary label as a guarantee. The misconduct patterns appeared among fiduciary advisers as well as brokers. Measured see Sources

Not financial advice.

Questions people ask

How many financial advisers have misconduct records?

About 7% of US advisers had at least one misconduct record in 2005–2015; the share rose above 15% at some large firms and to about one in five in some counties.

How can I check an adviser’s record?

FINRA’s BrokerCheck and the SEC’s adviser search show registration and disclosure histories in the United States. Other countries keep their own registers.

Is a fiduciary adviser safer?

A fiduciary duty sets a higher legal standard, yet one large study found similar misconduct patterns among fiduciary advisers and brokers.

How much does financial advice cost?

A large Canadian study found advised clients paying more than 2.5% a year in total fees. Costs vary widely by country, firm and payment model.

Is financial advice worth it?

It depends on the alternative. Studies find advice raises risk-taking and helps some undiversified investors, but low-cost defaults often did as well or better.

The short version

  • Roughly 7% of US advisers had a misconduct record; past offenders were five times as likely to offend again.
  • Within a year, almost half of the advisers who left after misconduct had found another job in the industry.
  • Mystery shoppers holding low-cost index portfolios were told to change strategy 85% of the time.
  • In Canada, clients paid more than 2.5% a year for advice shaped more by the adviser than by the client.
  • Advice can help investors who would otherwise stay in cash or hold a few stocks; whether it helps depends on the alternative.

This article summarises published research and official information on financial advice. It is not financial, investment, tax or legal advice, and it does not recommend or criticise any particular adviser, firm or product. Regulations differ between countries and change over time. Check an adviser’s registration with your national regulator before relying on them.

Further reading. Egan, Matvos and Seru, ‘The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct’, Journal of Political Economy, 2019, and their 2024 overview in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Chalmers and Reuter, Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, is the clearest test of advice against a realistic alternative.

Sources

  1. Egan M, Matvos G, Seru A. The market for financial adviser misconduct. Journal of Political Economy, 2019;127(1):233–295. doi:10.1086/700735.
  2. Egan M, Matvos G, Seru A. The problem of good conduct among financial advisers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2024;38(4):193–210. doi:10.1257/jep.38.4.193.
  3. Egan M, Matvos G, Seru A. When Harry fired Sally: the double standard in punishing misconduct. Journal of Political Economy, 2022;130(5):1184–1248. doi:10.1086/718964.
  4. Mullainathan S, Noeth M, Schoar A. The market for financial advice: an audit study. NBER Working Paper 17929, 2012. doi:10.3386/w17929.
  5. Foerster S, Linnainmaa JT, Melzer BT, Previtero A. Retail financial advice: does one size fit all? Journal of Finance, 2017;72(4):1441–1482. doi:10.1111/jofi.12514.
  6. Linnainmaa JT, Melzer BT, Previtero A. The misguided beliefs of financial advisors. Journal of Finance, 2021;76(2):587–621. doi:10.1111/jofi.12995.
  7. Bergstresser D, Chalmers JMR, Tufano P. Assessing the costs and benefits of brokers in the mutual fund industry. Review of Financial Studies, 2009;22(10):4129–4156. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp022.
  8. Egan M. Brokers versus retail investors: conflicting interests and dominated products. Journal of Finance, 2019;74(3):1217–1260. doi:10.1111/jofi.12763.
  9. Chalmers J, Reuter J. Is conflicted investment advice better than no advice? Journal of Financial Economics, 2020;138(2):366–387. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.05.005.
  10. Gennaioli N, Shleifer A, Vishny R. Money doctors. Journal of Finance, 2015;70(1):91–114. doi:10.1111/jofi.12188.
  11. D’Acunto F, Prabhala N, Rossi AG. The promises and pitfalls of robo-advising. Review of Financial Studies, 2019;32(5):1983–2020. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz014.
  12. Reuter J, Schoar A. Demand-side and supply-side constraints in the market for financial advice. NBER Working Paper 32452, 2024.
  13. Council of Economic Advisers. The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings. Executive Office of the President, February 2015.
  14. US Securities and Exchange Commission. Regulation Best Interest and Form CRS; statement on the 30 June 2020 compliance date.
  15. US Department of Labor. Press release on the vacatur of the Retirement Security Rule, 18 March 2026.
  16. Financial Conduct Authority. Early indications that reforms to financial advice are working. Press release, December 2014.
  17. FINRA. Key statistics, 2025; Expungement of customer dispute information.
  18. US Securities and Exchange Commission. Press release 2025-16 (Wells Fargo and Merrill Lynch cash sweep programmes), January 2025; Administrative proceeding IA-6912 (Vanguard Advisers), August 2025.
  19. SEC Office of Investor Education. “Check Out Your Investment Professional”.
  20. SEC Office of Investor Education. “Ask and Check”.
  21. SEC. Investor bulletin on relationship summaries (Form CRS) (6 August 2020).
  22. SEC. Investor bulletin on Form ADV (updated 27 August 2020).
  23. SEC. Form CRS instructions (SEC 2942).

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