Ninety Per Cent of Emergency Calls From One Indoor Spot Missed the Dispatcher. Ordinary Calls From the Same Spot Connected in Six Seconds.
Key takeaways · 13 min read
- Four in five significant European telecom outages come from the network failing on its own or from misconfiguration. Deliberate attacks were 8 per cent in 2024.
- In 2012, the first full reporting year, almost 40 per cent of the 79 reported incidents took down the 112 emergency number as a side effect.
- The February 2024 US outage began with one unreviewed configuration on one element. It dropped 125 million devices in three minutes; rollback took two hours and full recovery twelve.
- More than 25,000 911 calls failed that night, but the report does not say how many succeeded, so the failure rate is unknown.
In this article
- What actually takes a network down
- One element, three minutes, twelve hours
- Twenty-five thousand failed calls, and the number nobody published
- The call that fails with full bars
- Camp-on, and forty seconds of silence
- What the official pages say about 911 outages
- What the evidence does not show
- The short version
- Sources
Researchers at a single indoor spot on a university campus dialled an ordinary number, and the call connected over Wi-Fi in an average of 5.85 seconds. From the same spot, on the same phones and networks, they then dialled the emergency number. Ninety per cent of those calls had still not reached a dispatcher after two minutes, when the experimenters stopped waiting.
Nothing was broken. The Wi-Fi was strong, the handsets were carrier-certified, and the software followed the international standard, which says an emergency call must prefer the mobile network over Wi-Fi because mobile networks can guarantee bandwidth and give emergency traffic priority under congestion. The rule is reasonable. In a building with one bar and good Wi-Fi, it is also why the call does not go through.
This article is about how telephone networks fail and what fails first. Very little of it matches the picture most people carry, a mast down in a storm or a foreign intelligence service. In the European figures, deliberate attacks are eight per cent of significant incidents. The rest is equipment, software, and people typing the wrong thing at two in the morning.
What actually takes a network down
Twenty-eight European countries report their significant telecom outages to a common register, and the aggregate is published annually. For 2024 it holds 188 incidents. System failures, meaning hardware and software faults inside the operator’s own equipment, account for 113 of them, or 60 per cent. Human errors account for 35 (19 per cent), natural phenomena such as storms and floods for 25 (13 per cent), and malicious actions for 15 (8 per cent).
What caused Europe’s significant telecom outages in 2024
ENISA, Telecom Security Incidents 2024. 188 incidents reported by 26 EU member states and 2 EFTA countries.
Sixty and nineteen make seventy-nine: four incidents in five are the network breaking itself or somebody breaking it by accident. The ratio has been broadly stable for over a decade, and it runs against where public attention goes.
In its first full year the same register recorded something not published as cleanly since: of the 79 incidents reported for 2012, almost 40 per cent affected the ability to dial 112. That is 40 per cent of ordinary outages, not 40 per cent of emergency-service outages; the emergency number went down as a side effect because it rides on the same equipment as everything else.
One element, three minutes, twelve hours
On 22 February 2024, at 2:42 in the morning, an employee at a large American carrier loaded a configuration onto one network element during routine maintenance. The regulator’s report is blunt about the flaw: the configuration “did not conform to AT&T’s established network element design and installment procedures, which require peer review”. Nobody had checked it.
Three minutes later the network detected an inconsistency and did what it is designed to do: it entered a protective mode and disconnected rather than propagate corruption. More than 125 million registered devices went offline, across all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
Engineers had rolled the bad element back by about 4:45, two hours in, but the outage did not end at 4:45. It ended around 12:30 that afternoon, because when protection mode lifted, all 125 million devices tried to register at once and the registration systems were, in the regulator’s phrase, “overwhelmed with the high volume of requests”. The fault took two hours to fix, and the recovery from the fix another eight.
The night of 22 February 2024, by the clock
FCC, February 22, 2024 AT&T Mobility Network Outage: Report and Findings, July 2024.
Protection mode was the safety feature working, since a network running on a corrupt configuration does more damage than one that stops. The recovery then took four times as long as the repair, held up by the network’s own customers, a load you cannot test in a laboratory because you cannot borrow 125 million phones.
Twenty-five thousand failed calls, and the number nobody published
The headline figures from that night are more than 92 million voice calls blocked and more than 25,000 calls to 911 failed. Both come from the regulator and both are large, but neither can be turned into a rate, because the report does not say how many 911 calls succeeded in the same window.
The best national count puts US 911 volume at about 213.7 million calls in 2021, reported by 45 states, with roughly 89 per cent from mobile phones. Spread evenly, that is around 24,000 calls an hour across every carrier in the country, or near 290,000 over twelve hours. One carrier’s share is a fraction of that, and this outage’s worst hours fell between two and five in the morning, the quietest of the night. Done honestly, the arithmetic says 25,000 failures is a large share of what that carrier’s customers would have attempted.
A numerator in search of a denominator
FCC report, July 2024; National 911 Program, 2021 National 911 Profile Database Report (213.7 million calls, 45 states reporting; 5 states unknown, 6 did not submit).
The national count carries its own warnings: five states marked their totals unknown, six submitted nothing, and the report says tracking total 911 calls “requires input from many entities that may include estimates”. Even where it exists, the denominator is soft. The failure count is real and specific, while the failure rate is unknown and nobody holding the data has published it.
The call that fails with full bars
Outages make the dramatic story. The quieter finding, now measured by researchers, is that emergency calls fail on networks that are working perfectly.
A 2024 study built a model checker for the emergency-specific parts of the mobile standard, ran it against the specification, and took the predicted failures into the field. It found eleven design defects, and nine were confirmed on real networks, using three American carriers, two Taiwanese carriers, campus Wi-Fi and four carrier-certified handsets.
The clearest is the one in the opening paragraph. Because the standard requires an emergency call to prefer the mobile network, a phone in a weak-signal indoor spot will exhaust its attempts on the weak mobile network before it considers the strong Wi-Fi beside it. At one such location, ordinary calls connected over Wi-Fi in 4 to 7 seconds, averaging 5.85, while eighteen of twenty emergency calls from the same location hit the two-minute ceiling the researchers had set.
The second is stranger. A phone with no SIM has no home network to prefer and may take whichever network has the best signal, whereas a paying subscriber must try its own carrier first. Where coverage was uneven, subscribed phones took 61.3, 70.2 and 77.4 seconds to set up an emergency call on three networks. SIM-less phones in the same spot took 4.6 seconds in the United States and 3.7 in Taiwan.
Emergency call setup time, measured at the same locations
Hu et al., ACM CCS 2024. Three US and two Taiwan carriers, four handset models. 120 s was the experimenters’ own cut-off, not a natural endpoint; subscriber figure is the mean of 61.3, 70.2 and 77.4 s.
A third defect involves movement. The standard forbids certain handovers during an emergency call, from an older network generation up to a newer one and between carriers. In the validation walk, a call handed down from 4G to 3G kept going, then failed to hand back up when 3G weakened, and dropped at 112 seconds while a 4G signal of around −112 dBm was sitting right there unused.
Camp-on, and forty seconds of silence
Several countries have a rule for the case where your own carrier cannot carry your emergency call: the phone should camp on to any other available network and place the call there. The rule exists because of outages like these, and it is a good one.
An independent review of an Australian carrier’s September 2025 emergency-call failure, published in December 2025, put a number on camp-on: for many calls it may take 40 to 60 seconds. The reviewer added that in an emergency people are unlikely to hang on for that length of time, “especially when the only response they are getting is silence on the line”.
The same review found a configuration detail that shows how thin the margins are. At the time of the outage the carrier’s emergency inactivity timer was set to ten seconds, a change introduced to work around a problem with one handset model. It has since gone back to 600, in line with other networks at 150 to 600.
Two settings and a silence
Schott review of the 18 September 2025 Optus Triple Zero outage, published December 2025.
The same carrier’s November 2023 nationwide outage showed a problem with counting. More than ten million services were down for about twelve hours. The number of failed Triple Zero calls was first given as 228, then revised to roughly 2,696 after the company said a further 2,468 customers had tried unsuccessfully. The first figure was what the operator could see; the eleven-fold revision followed because the calls being counted had never arrived.
What the official pages say about 911 outages
This section collects what the FCC says about 911 calls, texting and outages. It is general information, not emergency advice. In a real emergency, try to call 911.
| Source | What it says |
|---|---|
| FCC, Text to 911: What You Need to Know (undated) | Always contact 911 by voice call if you can, because voice calls give call centers more information. Text-to-911 is available only in some places, and where it is not, you should receive an automatic reply telling you to use another method. |
| FCC, VoIP and 911 Service (undated) | Internet-based phone providers must get your physical location before service starts and offer an easy way to update it. If it is out of date, calls may reach the wrong call center. The service may stop working in a power or internet outage, so the FCC suggests backup power, a traditional line or a wireless phone. |
| FCC, 911 Reliability (page text begins “As of February 16, 2024”) | Covers call completion, reliability certifications by covered 911 providers, and outage reporting, including alerting a designated official at an affected 911 facility as soon as possible. |
| FCC, 911 Dispatchable Location (undated) | Describes rules adopted August 1, 2019 and effective January 6, 2020, under Kari’s Law and RAY BAUM’S Act Section 506, so that a 911 call can carry a street address plus room or floor details. |
| NENA, statement on a March 2017 outage (non-government association) | After one outage, callers who could not reach 911 were advised to look up a local 7- or 10-digit emergency number. This was advice for a single event in 2017, not general guidance. |
What we could not confirm: we did not find the phrase “call if you can, text if you can’t” on any FCC page we read, and we found no FCC or CISA page telling the public what to do when 911 is down. We did not read the 2025 FCC location-accuracy updates, and the text of the outage-reporting rule (47 CFR 4.9) was blocked to our tools, so we give no outage-reporting deadlines. The FCC pages above show no dates.
What the evidence does not show
Three objections apply to the account above, and the first two come from the people who produced the numbers.
The European register itself warns that trend conclusions “have to be made with caution, as national reporting thresholds change over the years”, and that only the most significant incidents are reported. Twenty-eight countries decide separately what counts as significant, and revise it, so the year-on-year count reflects reporting rules at least as much as reliability. The cause breakdown holds up better, because a misconfiguration is a misconfiguration whatever the threshold.
The emergency-call study is a model-checking exercise with small-scale field validation, and it is no incidence study. It shows that these failures exist and reproduce, and says nothing on how often a real caller meets one, which nobody has measured. The researchers also blocked every test call from reaching a dispatcher, so their setup times were measured to the moment the signalling was intercepted and understate the real thing by a few seconds, and the two-minute ceiling was their own stopping rule. The rule that produced the worst result, preferring the mobile network, exists to guarantee bandwidth and priority under congestion, a real benefit the study did not weigh against the cost it measured.
The third objection is the largest: networks are not getting worse. The European register holds 1,930 incidents across 2012 to 2024, and although the annual count has risen, the user-hours lost in 2024, 1,743 million, are back at the level of a decade earlier and 55 per cent below 2023. More incidents are reported, each costing less. Whether any of it costs lives is almost entirely unanswered: the studies linking telecom outages to health outcomes are simulation models of cascading failure, not counts of anybody.
Questions people ask
Does a phone with no SIM really call emergency services? Yes, in most countries, by design: regulators require carriers to carry emergency calls from any handset regardless of subscription. That freedom is what makes the SIM-less phone faster in a patchy-coverage spot, since it is not obliged to try one particular carrier first.
Should I turn Wi-Fi calling off, or on? The evidence does not support a general answer, and anyone offering one is guessing. The measured defect is that the standard prefers the mobile network for emergency calls whatever the Wi-Fi is doing, so the setting is not the lever people assume. Indoors, on one bar, an emergency call may take far longer than an ordinary one, and silence on the line does not mean it has failed.
Is a landline more reliable? It used to be reliable in a different way: powered from the exchange, it survived a household power cut. Most modern fixed lines run over broadband and die with the router. The European figures show fixed internet rising as a share of affected services, from 16 per cent in 2023 to 26 per cent in 2024. No category here is simply safe.
How would I know an outage was happening? Often you would not. In a core-network or routing failure the masts keep transmitting, so the phone shows full bars and gives no sign that anything is wrong, which is also why a phone may not look for another network to camp on to.
Are attacks going to become the main cause? Not so far: they were 8 per cent of reported European incidents in 2024 and 6 per cent in 2022. They may be worse per incident, and the register does not capture espionage that causes no outage. On the measure that exists, the network’s main adversary is itself.
The short version
- Four in five significant European telecom outages come from the network failing on its own or from misconfiguration. Deliberate attacks were 8 per cent in 2024.
- In 2012, the first full reporting year, almost 40 per cent of the 79 reported incidents took down the 112 emergency number as a side effect.
- The February 2024 US outage began with one unreviewed configuration on one element. It dropped 125 million devices in three minutes; rollback took two hours and full recovery twelve.
- More than 25,000 911 calls failed that night, but the report does not say how many succeeded, so the failure rate is unknown.
- At one indoor test location, 90 per cent of emergency calls did not reach a dispatcher within two minutes, while ordinary calls from the same spot connected in 5.85 seconds.
- A phone with no SIM set up an emergency call in under five seconds where a paying subscriber took over a minute, because the subscriber must try its own network first.
- Camping on to another carrier may take 40 to 60 seconds of silence, and people hang up.
- Nobody has measured how often real callers hit any of this, or what it costs in outcomes. The counting stops at the call.
This describes what published incident reports and peer-reviewed measurements have found about telecom outages and emergency calling. It is not safety advice and not a guide to what to do in an emergency; if you need emergency services, dial the number for your country and stay on the line. Incident figures come from the official reports named below and reflect what those investigations could establish, which in several cases changed after publication. Where the evidence cannot settle a question — how often these failures reach real callers, above all — that is said rather than resolved.
Further reading: the FCC’s report on the February 2024 outage is fifteen pages, written for a general reader, and is the clearest published account of how a single configuration becomes a national event. ENISA’s annual telecom incident reports are free, short, and the only place the cause breakdown is published consistently. The 2024 emergency-call paper is written for specialists but its figures 6 to 10 can be read on their own.
Sources
- Federal Communications Commission, February 22, 2024 AT&T Mobility Network Outage: Report and Findings, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, July 2024. (Configuration loaded at 2:42 a.m. ET that “did not conform to AT&T’s established network element design and installment procedures, which require peer review”; outage began 2:45. More than 125 million registered devices disconnected across all 50 states, DC, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. More than 92 million voice calls blocked, more than 25,000 calls to 911 failed. Rollback complete by approximately 4:45 a.m.; FirstNet restored 5:00 a.m.; registrations normalised about 12:30 p.m. after all devices attempted simultaneous re-registration. Referred to the Enforcement Bureau for potential violations of parts 4 and 9.)
- European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Telecom Security Incidents 2024, July 2025. (188 incidents, 26 EU member states and 2 EFTA countries, against 156 in 2023. System failures 113 incidents / 60%; human errors 35 / 19%; natural phenomena 25 / 13%; malicious actions 15 / 8%. Total 1,743 million user hours lost, 55% below 2023. Fixed internet affected in 26% of incidents against 16% in 2023. 1,930 incidents recorded 2012–2024. States that trend conclusions “have to be made with caution, as national reporting thresholds change over the years” and that reporting “only covers the most significant incidents”.)
- ENISA, Annual Incident Reports 2012. (79 significant incidents; system failures 75%. “Almost 40% of the incidents affected the possibility of dialling the emergency number 112.”)
- ENISA, Telecom Security Incidents 2022. (155 incidents; system failures 72%, human errors 15%, malicious actions 6%, natural phenomena 6%. Of 10,481 million user hours lost to system failures, 1,048 million were power cuts. Third-party failures flagged in 23% of incidents.)
- Hu, Y., Chen, M.-Y., Yan, H., Cheng, C.F., Tu, G.-H. and Li, C.-Y., “Uncovering Problematic Designs Hindering Ubiquitous Cellular Emergency Services Access”, ACM CCS, 2024. (11 design defects, 9 validated across three US and two Taiwan carriers, campus Wi-Fi and four carrier-certified handsets. At location P7, 4G no stronger than −120 dBm and Wi-Fi no weaker than −55 dBm: non-emergency calls connected over Wi-Fi in 4–7 s, mean 5.85 s, while 18 of 20 emergency calls hit the 120-second ceiling — 90% not connected within two minutes. Subscribed handsets took 61.3, 70.2 and 77.4 s at uneven-coverage locations against 4.6 s (US) and 3.7 s (Taiwan) for SIM-less handsets. A call handed to 3G dropped at 112 s despite a 4G signal of about −112 dBm, because 3G-to-4G escalation during a call is forbidden. Test calls were blocked from reaching PSAPs, so measured setup times understate the real ones.)
- Schott, K., independent review of the Optus Triple Zero outage of 18 September 2025, December 2025. (“For many calls it may take 40–60 seconds to camp-on”. Optus had set its emergency inactivity timer to 10 seconds to work around an issue with Google Pixel 6A devices, since reverted to 600 s against other networks’ 150–600. Notes that people are unlikely to wait “especially when the only response they are getting is silence on the line”.)
- Bean, R., Review into the Optus outage of 8 November 2023, Australian Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, 2024. (More than 10 million services affected for about 12 hours; 18 recommendations. Failed Triple Zero calls first reported as 228; Optus later stated a further 2,468 customers had tried unsuccessfully, giving approximately 2,696.)
- National 911 Program, 2021 National 911 Profile Database Report. (45 states reported approximately 213.7 million 911 calls to primary PSAPs in 2021; 40 states reported 138.1 million wireless against 17.7 million wireline; 4,637 primary and 656 secondary PSAPs. Five states marked totals unknown, six did not submit; tracking total calls “requires input from many entities that may include estimates”.)
- O’Reilly, G.P., Richman, S.H. and Kelic, A., “Power, telecommunications, and emergency services in a converged network world”, DRCN, 2007. (A dynamic simulation of power outages cascading into telecom and then into 911 access and injury severity. Cited here as an example of what kind of evidence exists on the health question: a model, not a count.)
- FCC: Text to 911; VoIP and 911 Service; 911 Reliability; 911 Dispatchable Location. NENA (non-government): statement on the March 8, 2017 outage.
