Dark cover tile reading $1,678 vs $3,300, over a subtitle about the median cash forfeiture across 24 states and the estimated cost of contesting one.
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The Median Forfeiture Is $1,678. A Lawyer to Contest It Costs About Twice That.

Key takeaways · 10 min read

  • The median cash forfeiture in the states that report it is $1,678, against an estimated $3,300 to contest one. That gap is the mechanism, and the standard of proof matters far less.
  • Seventy-one per cent of federal forfeitures are administrative, so no judge ever sees them. In three states with records, 62 to 76 per cent of seizures were forfeited by default.
  • In half the states, the statutory deadlines before a hearing add up to 188 days.
  • At least $82 billion has been forfeited since 2000. The people who produced that figure say it is likely an undercount, and sixteen states cannot be counted at all.

Across the twenty-four states that publish the figure, the median cash forfeiture is $1,678, and the estimated cost of hiring an attorney to contest one is about $3,300. Nearly everything else about civil forfeiture follows from those two numbers sitting side by side.

Civil forfeiture is a proceeding against property rather than against a person. In most jurisdictions the government does not have to charge the owner or convict anyone, because the case is formally against the cash or the car. The owner who wants the property back has to act within a deadline, usually in writing and usually without a lawyer, since nobody appoints one for a civil case about $1,678.

What follows is what the published data establish. On the money they establish quite a lot. On whether any of it reduces crime they establish remarkably little, and the two best attempts to answer that question point in opposite directions.

The number that decides everything

What a typical forfeiture is worth, and what fighting it costs

$1,678Median currency forfeiture across the 24 states that report case-level values.
~$3,300Estimated cost of retaining an attorney to contest a forfeiture. The estimate is the Institute for Justice’s own.

Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit, 4th edition, March 2026.

A rational owner facing that arithmetic does nothing, and the data show that most owners do exactly that. Seventy-one per cent of federal forfeitures are administrative: the seizing agency completes them itself, with no judge involved at any point, because no claim was ever filed. In the three states whose records allow the question to be asked, between 62 and 76 per cent of seizures ended in forfeiture by default.

How forfeitures are actually resolved

Federal forfeitures completed administratively no court, no judge, no claim filed71%
Seizures forfeited by default three states with usable records; range across them62–76%

Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit, 4th ed., 2026. The three-state range covers the only jurisdictions whose published case records identify default outcomes.

This part of the subject is often described backwards. The usual complaint is that the standard of proof is too low, and in many states it is, but that standard only matters in cases that reach a hearing, and roughly seven in ten never do. The operative mechanism is the absence of a trial, produced by a price.

Time does the rest. Summing the statutory deadlines between a seizure and a hearing, the Institute for Justice reports that in half the states those known waiting periods add up to 188 days: six months without the money before the argument about the money begins.

A pointillist illustration: a night road with one car pulled onto the hard shoulder, its tail lights burning
Most of it happens here, at the roadside, where no judge is sitting.

Eighty-two billion dollars, counted badly

The scale is large and the measurement of it is poor. Compiling every federal and state record it could obtain, the Institute for Justice puts the total forfeited since 2000 at at least $82 billion. Federal forfeiture has run at $2 to $3 billion a year since 2014, and the 34 states with usable annual data forfeit somewhere between $300 and $350 million a year between them. For 2023, 45 states reported about $300 million, against roughly $4.5 billion federally.

The scale, as far as it can be measured

$82bn+Total forfeited since 2000 across every federal and state record the researchers could obtain.
$2–3bnFederal forfeiture per year, roughly stable since 2014.
$300–350mCombined annual state and local forfeiture across the 34 states that publish enough to count.
202345 states reported about $300m; federal forfeiture that year was about $4.5bn. The federal channel is roughly fifteen times the reported state one.

Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit, 4th ed., 2026.

The authors add a caveat of their own, which is unusual for an advocacy organisation undercutting its own headline: these figures “are likely undercounts, as data remain limited”. Sixteen states cannot be counted at all. Nobody knows the true total, including the people who produced the best estimate of it.

Does it reduce crime?

The entire policy rests on this question, and it has been asked properly perhaps half a dozen times. The most direct attempt assembled forfeiture records from five states (Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan and Minnesota), covering hundreds of agencies from 2005 to 2013, with $441.9 million in state and local proceeds plus $218.3 million routed through the federal equitable sharing programme, and tested them against crime-clearance and drug-use outcomes.

It found nothing. More forfeiture revenue showed no association with higher clearance rates for any offence category and none with improvement on any of four separate measures of drug use. The one association that reached significance ran the wrong way: a $1,000 increase in forfeiture proceeds per officer was associated with a decrease in violent-crime clearance rates of 7 per 1,000 incidents.

Five states, hundreds of agencies, nine years

$660mForfeiture proceeds analysed: $441.9m state and local, $218.3m equitable sharing, 2005–2013.
0Offence categories where more forfeiture revenue was associated with higher crime clearance.
−7Violent-crime clearances per 1,000 incidents, per $1,000 of forfeiture proceeds per officer. The only significant association found, and it is negative.

Kelly, B.D., Does Forfeiture Work?, Institute for Justice, 2021.

A null result is no proof of absence, and this one comes from the organisation that litigates against forfeiture. The study design is conventional, though, the data are administrative and drawn from no survey, and no comparably sized study has found the positive result. The crime-reduction case for forfeiture has never been demonstrated, which is different from having been refuted.

What rises when budgets fall

The same study found something the crime models did not predict: a one percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate was associated with a 12 per cent increase in forfeiture proceeds. That coefficient is significant only at the ten per cent level, which is weak, so it is a suggestion and no finding. Other work has independently produced the same suggestion.

A pointillist illustration: a four-drawer filing cabinet in a dark room, one drawer pulled open and lit from inside
Seventy-one per cent of federal forfeitures end in a drawer, not a courtroom.

An analysis in the Journal of Law and Economics looked at what happens when a municipality runs a deficit and its police department is allowed to keep what it seizes. Arrests rose for drug offences, driving under the influence and prostitution, the offence categories that generate seizable property. Seizures from Black and Hispanic people rose. Drug and DUI arrests of white people showed no comparable sensitivity to the local fiscal position.

A separate line of work found that the larger the share of a local government’s revenue that comes from fees, fines and forfeitures, the lower its violent-crime and property-crime clearance rates, significantly so for both. These are correlations across jurisdictions, and jurisdictions that lean on fine revenue differ in many other ways. Three independent research groups using different data keep finding the same shape, though: the fiscal position of the agency predicts its enforcement pattern.

Three findings about budgets and enforcement

+12%Forfeiture proceeds, per one percentage point of local unemployment. Significant only at p<.10 — treat as weak.
DeficitsWhere police retain proceeds, municipal deficits are followed by more drug, DUI and prostitution arrests, and more seizures from Black and Hispanic people. White drug and DUI arrests do not move with the deficit.
ClearanceA higher revenue share from fees, fines and forfeitures predicts significantly lower violent and property crime clearance rates.

Kelly 2021; Makowsky, Stratmann & Tabarrok, Journal of Law and Economics, 2019; Goldstein, You & Sances.

Reform leaks into the federal channel

Most states have passed some kind of forfeiture reform, whether raising the standard of proof, requiring a conviction or capping what the seizing agency may keep. Two large studies asked whether those laws bind, and got the same answer.

One examined roughly 600 agencies over 2000 to 2012; the other examined 572 agencies. Both found that agencies in states with more restrictive forfeiture laws collect more money through federal equitable sharing, the arrangement under which a local agency partners with a federal one, the case proceeds under federal law, and the proceeds come back. The state reform raises the cost of the state route, and the traffic moves to a route the state legislature does not control.

This is the most practically important finding in the literature, because a state-level reform evaluated on state-level data will look more effective than it is. The money does not stop. It changes address.

A pointillist illustration: a government service counter at night, three windows, two shuttered and one still lit, with a single empty chair in front of it
Six months of deadlines, in half the states, before anyone hears the argument.

What federal law says if your property is seized

This section covers federal civil forfeiture only. State laws differ and are not covered here. It is general information, not legal advice.

Step and what the sources say
StepWhat the pages say
NoticeUnder 18 U.S.C. § 983, the government generally must send notice within 60 days of the seizure, or within 90 days if a state or local agency seized the property and handed it to a federal agency.
Filing a claimThe deadline is the date in the notice letter, which must be at least 35 days after mailing. If you never received the letter, it is 30 days after the final publication of notice.
Who has to prove whatThe government’s burden is a preponderance of the evidence. The statute also provides an innocent owner defence.
If you cannot afford a lawyerIf a claimant is financially unable to afford counsel and the property is their primary residence, the court can appoint an attorney from Legal Services Corporation, at the claimant’s request.
Getting property back while the case runsFor hardship release you ask the agency for possession first. If it is not released within 15 days, you may petition the district court, which decides within 30 days unless the time is extended.
Petition for remission or mitigationForfeiture.gov says the petition must be signed under oath (or an unsworn statement under penalty of perjury) and that you do not need an attorney to file it. The government may grant remission or mitigation. Check your notice for the deadline.
Types of federal forfeitureThe Department of Justice (DOJ) lists administrative, civil judicial and criminal forfeiture (page updated Oct. 11, 2023).

What we could not confirm: any 2025 or 2026 change to the DOJ equitable sharing policy (the relevant Justice Manual sections show an “updated January 2026” label but no readable content), the median-value and legal-cost figures sometimes quoted for these cases, and the forfeiture.gov page on how to file a claim (we read only the petition page).

What the evidence does not show

Four findings cut against the summary above, and a reader who only hears the critical case is being handled.

One of the two equitable-sharing studies declined to draw the conclusion usually drawn from it. Having found no clear state-level “policing for profit” effect, its authors wrote that they “cannot assert that policing for profit is necessarily problematic”. A study in Economic Inquiry that did find agencies responding to forfeiture incentives described those responses as “in economic terms very weak”, a result that damages the reform case and the enforcement case at the same time.

Another Economic Inquiry paper, and the most awkward for everything above, exploited the gap between state law and federal equitable sharing as a natural experiment. Where the federal channel let police keep more than their own state permitted, crime fell by about 17 per cent and drug arrests rose 37 per cent. The same paper found roadway fatalities rose. That is a real deterrence estimate from a credible design, and it is the strongest published evidence that forfeiture does something.

There is also a question about whether the money is even an incentive. One study found that local governments respond to seizure revenue by reducing their other allocations to the police, which offsets the windfall. If that holds generally, the department does not end up richer, and the behavioural story that the whole critique rests on weakens considerably.

Two credible studies that do not agree

No effectFive states, 2005–2013, hundreds of agencies. Forfeiture proceeds show no association with crime clearance or drug use; the one significant coefficient is negative.
−17%Crime, where federal equitable sharing let police keep more than state law allowed; drug arrests +37%. Roadway fatalities rose.

Kelly 2021; Kantor, Kitchens & Pawlowski, Economic Inquiry, 2021. Different designs, different identifying assumptions, opposite conclusions. Neither has been overturned.

The source of most of the numbers in this article deserves a name. The Institute for Justice is a libertarian public-interest law firm that litigates forfeiture cases. Its data collection is the most thorough that exists, its methods are documented, and it publishes its own undercount warnings, but it is no neutral party, and the $3,300 attorney-cost figure at the top of this article is its own estimate and no measured market price. Use the money figures and treat the framing as an argument.

The short version

  • The median cash forfeiture in the states that report it is $1,678, against an estimated $3,300 to contest one. That gap is the mechanism, and the standard of proof matters far less.
  • Seventy-one per cent of federal forfeitures are administrative, so no judge ever sees them. In three states with records, 62 to 76 per cent of seizures were forfeited by default.
  • In half the states, the statutory deadlines before a hearing add up to 188 days.
  • At least $82 billion has been forfeited since 2000. The people who produced that figure say it is likely an undercount, and sixteen states cannot be counted at all.
  • Across five states and nine years, forfeiture proceeds showed no association with crime clearance or drug use. The one significant coefficient was negative.
  • Local fiscal stress predicts enforcement: unemployment, municipal deficits and fine-revenue dependence all track forfeiture activity and arrest patterns.
  • State reforms push money into federal equitable sharing rather than stopping it, so state-level evaluations overstate their own success.
  • One strong natural experiment found crime fell about 17 per cent where police could keep more. It has not been refuted, and it contradicts the null results. The question is open.

This describes what published administrative data and peer-reviewed research have found about civil asset forfeiture in the United States. It is not legal advice and not a guide to any individual case; forfeiture deadlines are short, vary by state and by whether the case is state or federal, and anyone whose property has been seized should speak to a lawyer licensed in that jurisdiction rather than rely on anything here. Several of the figures come from an organisation that litigates against the practice, which is noted where it matters. Where the evidence cannot settle a question — whether forfeiture affects crime, above all — that is said rather than resolved.

Further reading: the Policing for Profit state-by-state appendix is the only place the raw numbers are assembled, and each state’s page can be read on its own in two minutes. Does Forfeiture Work? is a short report whose methods section is unusually readable for a regression study. The Economic Inquiry deterrence paper is technical, but its introduction states the identification strategy plainly enough to judge.

Sources

  • Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, 4th edition, March 2026. (At least $82bn forfeited since 2000 across all obtainable federal and state records. Federal forfeiture $2–3bn per year since 2014; 34 states with usable data forfeit $300–350m per year combined; in 2023, 45 states reported about $300m against about $4.5bn federally. Median currency forfeiture $1,678 across 24 states; estimated attorney cost to contest, $3,300. 71% of federal forfeitures administrative. In three states with usable records, 62–76% of seizures forfeited by default. “In half the states, the known deadlines leading up to a hearing add up to 188 days.” States that the figures “are likely undercounts, as data remain limited”. IJ is a public-interest law firm that litigates forfeiture cases.)
  • Kelly, B.D., Does Forfeiture Work? Evidence from the States, Institute for Justice, 2021. (Five states — AZ, HI, IA, MI, MN — hundreds of agencies, 2005–2013. $441.9m state and local proceeds plus $218.3m equitable sharing. No association between forfeiture proceeds and crime clearance rates for any offence category, and none with four separate drug-use measures. “A $1,000 increase in forfeiture proceeds per officer is associated with a decrease in violent crime clearance rates of 7 per 1,000 incidents.” “A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate…is associated with a 12% increase in forfeiture proceeds”, significant at p<.10 only.)
  • Makowsky, M.D., Stratmann, T. and Tabarrok, A., “To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement”, Journal of Law and Economics, 2019. (Where police retain forfeiture proceeds, municipal deficits are followed by increased arrests for drug, DUI and prostitution offences and increased seizures from Black and Hispanic people; white drug and DUI arrests show no comparable sensitivity to the local fiscal position.)
  • Holcomb, J.E. et al., “Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by the Police”, Criminology & Public Policy, 2018. (About 600 agencies, 2000–2012. Agencies in states with more restrictive forfeiture statutes collect more federal equitable sharing revenue.)
  • Worrall, J.L. and Kovandzic, T.V., “Is Policing for Profit? Answers from Asset Forfeiture”, Criminology & Public Policy, 2008. (572 agencies. Same equitable-sharing displacement result. The authors state they “cannot assert that policing for profit is necessarily problematic”.)
  • Kantor, S., Kitchens, C. and Pawlowski, S., “Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984”, Economic Inquiry, 2021. (Where federal equitable sharing allowed police to retain more than state law permitted, crime fell by approximately 17% and drug arrests rose 37%; roadway fatalities increased. The strongest published deterrence estimate in this literature, and in direct tension with the null results above.)
  • Kelly, B.D. and Kole, M., “The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel Approach”, Economic Inquiry, 2013. (Finds agencies do respond to forfeiture incentives, but describes the responses as “in economic terms very weak”.)
  • Goldstein, R., You, H.Y. and Sances, M.W., work on local revenue composition and clearance rates. (A higher share of local revenue from fees, fines and forfeitures is associated with significantly lower violent-crime and property-crime clearance rates. Cross-sectional; jurisdictions that depend on fine revenue differ in other ways.)
  • Jacobson, M. and Baicker, K., on fiscal offsetting. (Local governments reduce other police allocations in response to seizure revenue, offsetting rather than compounding the windfall. If general, this weakens the behavioural mechanism the critique depends on.)
  • 18 U.S.C. § 983, General rules for civil forfeiture proceedings (Cornell LII). law.cornell.edu.
  • Forfeiture.gov (DOJ). Petition Information. forfeiture.gov.
  • DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program. Types of Federal Forfeiture, updated Oct. 11, 2023. justice.gov.

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