Why Most Stock Investors Lose Money: What the Evidence Actually Shows
In This Series: Personal Finance & Investing
- Options and Futures: Where Retail Money Actually Goes
- Two Retirees, the Same Returns, Only One Runs Out. The Difference Is the Order.
- Deposit Insurance Stops at $250,000. Since 2008, Uninsured Depositors Have Actually Lost Money in Six Per Cent of Failures.
- Courts Resolve More Than Seventy Per Cent of Debt Suits Without a Defence. Fewer Than One Defendant in Ten Has a Lawyer.
- Your Home Insurance Almost Certainly Does Not Cover Flooding
- The Median Forfeiture Is $1,678. A Lawyer to Contest It Costs About Twice That.
Key takeaways · 16 min read
- Only 42.6% of 25,967 US stocks beat one-month Treasury bills over their entire listed lives, 1926–2016. The most common single outcome was a loss of essentially 100%.
- Slightly more than 4% of listed companies account for the market’s entire $34.82 trillion of net wealth creation. Miss them and you get the other 96%.
- Across 66,465 US households, the most active fifth of traders trailed the market by about 6.5 percentage points a year. Their gross returns were normal; the gap was cost.
- In Taiwan’s full market record, fewer than 1% of day traders earned reliably positive returns net of fees. In Brazil, 97% of those who persisted past 300 days lost money.
In this article
- The market goes up. Most individual stocks do not.
- The more you trade, the more it costs you
- Day trading is the same arithmetic, run faster
- The professionals do not escape it either
- The gap between what the fund earned and what its investors earned
- Where the losses actually come from
- What the official pages say about why investors underperform
- Questions people ask
- The short version
- Sources
Investment risk gets discussed in two versions. The familiar one is volatility: the market falls, your account is worth less, you wait, it recovers, and for a diversified holder that is mostly a test of patience. The other gets far less attention and does more damage to capital: the outcome of any individual stock looks nothing like the average, and trading subtracts from whatever the average would have given you.
Both have been measured, repeatedly, on very large samples in several countries, by researchers with access to actual brokerage records rather than survey answers.
This article sets out what that research found, including the parts that cut against the tidy version of the story. It describes published evidence and is not advice about what you personally should hold, since nobody writing a public article can know your tax position, your time horizon, or what else you own.
The market goes up. Most individual stocks do not.
The most useful single study is Hendrik Bessembinder’s Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2018. He took every US common stock in the CRSP database from July 1926 to December 2016 (25,967 of them) and calculated each one’s buy-and-hold return over its entire listed life, from first appearance to delisting, merger or the end of the sample.
Only 42.6% of those stocks returned more over their whole lifetime than one-month Treasury bills. Rounded to the nearest 5%, the most frequent single outcome was a loss of essentially 100%: about 11.8% of the stocks ended at or near zero. The entire $34.82 trillion of net wealth the US stock market created over ninety years is attributable to slightly more than 4% of the listed companies, and the other 96% collectively matched Treasury bills.
Lifetime outcomes of 25,967 US common stocks, 1926–2016
Buy-and-hold return over each stock’s entire listed life, measured against one-month Treasury bills.
Source: Bessembinder, H., “Do stocks outperform Treasury bills?”, Journal of Financial Economics, 129(3), 2018.
This is positive skew, and its practical consequence rarely gets explained. A few extreme winners pull the average stock return upward, while the typical stock return sits well below it. Own the whole market and you capture the average; own eight names and you draw eight tickets from a distribution whose most common single outcome is total loss.
That is the structural reason concentrated stock picking loses money: it follows from the shape of the distribution, whatever the picker’s intelligence.
The more you trade, the more it costs you
The second finding concerns behaviour. Brad Barber and Terrance Odean obtained the trading records of 66,465 households at a large US discount broker covering January 1991 to January 1997, and published the result in the Journal of Finance in 2000 under the title Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth.
The average household earned 16.4% a year net of costs while the market returned 17.9%, a shortfall of about 1.4 percentage points. The most active fifth, ranked by portfolio turnover, earned 11.4%. That is a shortfall of roughly 6.5 percentage points a year against a market anyone could have bought and left alone. The average household turned over more than 75% of its stock portfolio every year; the most active fifth turned over 21.5% of theirs every month.
Annual net return, US discount-brokerage households, 1991–1997
66,465 households. Shortfall measured against the market return over the same period.
Source: Barber, B.M. and Odean, T., “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors”, Journal of Finance, 55(2), 2000.
If the frequent traders had been picking systematically worse companies, better research would have fixed it. They were not: their gross returns were roughly the same as everyone else’s, and the entire difference was the bill for the activity, meaning commissions and the bid-ask spread paid over and over.
Commissions on US retail stock trades have since gone to zero, which removes one of the two costs Barber and Odean measured. The spread remains, and so does the second mechanism they identified: overconfident traders sold stocks that went on to do better than the ones they bought. Zero commissions also made trading easier, which is the opposite of a brake.
Day trading is the same arithmetic, run faster
If frequent trading costs a percentage point or six a year, the question is what happens at the limit; two datasets covering entire national markets answer it.
Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean studied the complete Taiwan Stock Exchange record from 1992 to 2006, a market where roughly 450,000 people a year engaged in day trading. Their conclusion, in the paper’s own words, is that less than 1% of the day-trading population is able to predictably and reliably earn positive abnormal returns net of fees, on the order of 4,000 people out of 450,000. The top 500 traders by past performance did earn a real edge, about 37.9 basis points a day net of costs. The bottom of the distribution lost 28.9 basis points a day net.
The second dataset is Brazilian, and it belongs as much to the companion article on options and futures as to this one, because it is a futures market. Chague, De-Losso and Giovannetti took every individual who started day trading Brazilian equity index futures between 2013 and 2015 and followed them. Of those who persisted for more than 300 trading days, 97% lost money. Only 1.1% earned more than the Brazilian minimum wage, and 0.5% earned more than the starting salary of a bank teller, and those few did so, in the authors’ phrase, with great risk.
What full-population day-trading records show
Two national datasets, two markets, fifteen years apart in methodology.
Sources: Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean, “The Cross-Section of Speculator Skill: Evidence from Day Trading”, Journal of Financial Markets, 2014. Chague, De-Losso and Giovannetti, “Day Trading for a Living?”, working paper, 2019.
Discussion of this subject has a survivorship trap built in. The people visible on a trading forum, a YouTube channel or a brokerage leaderboard are, by construction, the ones still there. The 97% who stopped are not posting, so any impression formed from who is currently talking is an impression of the surviving 3%.
The professionals do not escape it either
It would be convenient if the conclusion were simply “amateurs lose, so hire a professional”. The SPIVA scorecard that S&P Dow Jones Indices has published twice a year since 2002 does not support that either.
In the mid-year 2025 edition, measured to 30 June 2025, 85.98% of actively managed US large-cap equity funds had underperformed the S&P 500 over ten years, and 88.29% had underperformed it over fifteen. Widening to all actively managed domestic equity funds against the S&P Composite 1500, the ten-year figure was 90.31% and the fifteen-year figure 92.52%.
Share of active US equity funds underperforming their benchmark
SPIVA U.S. Scorecard, data to 30 June 2025.
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Scorecard Mid-Year 2025.
The counter-evidence here is serious. In May 2026 three academics (Martijn Cremers of Notre Dame, Jon Fulkerson of Dayton and Timothy Riley of Arkansas) published a study rebuilding the comparison with three changes. They weighted funds by assets rather than counting each fund equally, so the calculation follows the dollars people actually had. They credited a fund for the period it existed instead of automatically marking a closed fund as an underperformer. And they compared active funds against real passive index funds, which you can buy, rather than against an index, which you cannot. On that basis, 55% of assets underperformed rather than SPIVA’s 92%, which is close to a coin flip. For fixed income the figure fell from 71% to 37%.
Neither number is disinterested. S&P Dow Jones Indices licenses the indices that passive funds track. The Cremers study was sponsored by the Investment Adviser Association’s Active Managers Council, which represents the managers being scored. What survives both sets of accounts is narrower than the headline but still useful: paying for active management has not been a reliable way to beat a low-cost index fund, and the odds are somewhere between even and heavily against, depending on choices in the arithmetic that reasonable people dispute.
The gap between what the fund earned and what its investors earned
One more layer concerns the investor directly. A fund reports a total return: what one dollar left alone from the start of the period would have become. Investors do not leave one dollar alone from the start. They add money after good years and take it out after bad ones. Weighting the return by how much money was actually present at each moment gives a different figure, usually a lower one.
Morningstar publishes that calculation annually as Mind the Gap. In the 2025 edition, covering the ten years to 31 December 2024, US mutual funds and ETFs produced an aggregate total return of 8.2% a year while the average dollar invested in them earned 7.0%. The gap is 1.2 percentage points a year, roughly 15% of the total return, given away to the timing of purchases and sales.
The gap is uneven. Sector equity funds (narrow, exciting, easy to trade in and out of) had the widest gap at 1.5 percentage points, while allocation funds, which include target-date funds and do their own rebalancing, had the narrowest at 0.1 percentage points; their investors captured about 97% of the fund return.
How much of the gap is really bad timing?
Two published estimates of the same phenomenon, using the same underlying fund data.
Sources: Morningstar, Mind the Gap 2025. Fulkerson, J.A., Jordan, B.D., Riley, T.B. and Yan, Q., “Bad Timing Does Not Cost Investors 15% of Their Funds’ Returns”, Financial Analysts Journal, 2026.
Dollar-weighted returns have a known statistical property: a fund that grows in size will show a gap even if every single investor bought and held perfectly, purely because more money was present during later periods than earlier ones. Fulkerson, Jordan, Riley and Yan take that out and find the genuine cost of mistimed buying and selling is about 0.10 percentage points a year, one twelfth of the headline. Two of those authors are also on the SPIVA critique above, which is worth knowing when you read either.
So the behaviour-gap story is real but much smaller than it is usually sold as. The trading-cost story from Barber and Odean, measured directly on brokerage records rather than inferred from fund flows, is the sturdier of the two.
Where the losses actually come from
Concentration you did not choose
Buying an index fund is normally described as diversification, and relative to owning six stocks it is. But the S&P 500 is not equally weighted, and in May 2026 J.P. Morgan Asset Management put the top ten holdings at 40.8% of the index — against a dot-com peak of 26.6%. Those ten companies produce a little over a third of the index’s earnings while accounting for two-fifths of its value.
Weight of the ten largest holdings in the S&P 500
Share of total index market capitalisation.
Source: J.P. Morgan Asset Management, “How extreme is market concentration?”, May 2026.
The arithmetic of getting back to even
Losses and gains are not symmetric, and once people see the arithmetic it changes how they think about drawdowns: a loss of a given size requires a larger gain to reverse, and the requirement grows faster than the loss.
Gain required to recover a loss
Simple arithmetic, no assumptions.
| Loss | Value left, per $100 | Gain needed to break even |
|---|---|---|
| −10% | $90 | +11.1% |
| −25% | $75 | +33.3% |
| −50% | $50 | +100% |
| −75% | $25 | +300% |
| −90% | $10 | +900% |
| −100% | $0 | impossible |
Arithmetic; no source required.
Where the information came from
The FINRA Investor Education Foundation published research in 2026 on investors who use social media for investment information, and the age split is large: 60% of investors aged 18 to 34 use social media this way against 9% of those 55 or older, and 61% of the younger group had made an investment decision based on a recommendation from a social media personality, against 6% of the older group.
Social media users scored an average of 42% on an objective investment knowledge quiz while 63% rated their own investment knowledge as high, and 68% reported having lost money to fraud, against 29% of non-users. That last figure is self-reported and correlational, so it does not establish that social media caused the fraud losses, and people who are more active in markets generally have more exposure to everything, including scams. It is still a large enough difference to be worth knowing before taking a stock idea from a video.
What the official pages say about why investors underperform
This section collects what the SEC and FINRA say about fees, trading habits and market timing, plus one recent rule change. It is general information, not investment advice.
| Source | What it says |
|---|---|
| SEC, Behavioral Patterns of U.S. Investors (June 16, 2014) | Lists nine behaviours, including active trading (which it says generally results in underperformance), the disposition effect, performance chasing, ignoring fees and inadequate diversification. It prints no statistics. |
| Library of Congress for the SEC, Behavioral Patterns and Pitfalls of U.S. Investors (Aug. 2010) | Says active traders underperform the market, citing academic studies, but gives no return percentages. It notes the average investor holds three or four stocks, while theory suggests far more. It is old but still hosted by the SEC. |
| SEC, Understanding Fees (undated) | A hypothetical $100,000 growing 4% a year for 20 years ends near $208,000 with a 0.25% annual fee, $198,000 with 0.50% and $179,000 with 1.00%. |
| SEC, Mutual Fund and ETF Fees and Expenses (July 23, 2025) | A 5% front-end load on $10,000 leaves $9,500 invested. “No-load” does not mean no fees, and the prospectus fee table does not show brokerage commissions. |
| FINRA, What Is Market Timing? (June 10, 2025) | Lists the risks as transaction costs, missing the best days, taxes and emotions. It gives no statistics. |
| SEC, Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation (undated) | Says large company stocks as a group have lost money on average about one year in three, that you need at least a dozen carefully selected stocks to be truly diversified, and that rebalancing should be infrequent. |
| FINRA Foundation (a nonprofit, not a regulator), Investors in the United States (Dec. 2025) | A self-reported survey of 2,861 US adults with non-retirement investments, taken July to December 2024. The average score on an 11-question knowledge quiz was 5.3, and 50% said they would invest in a “guaranteed, risk-free 25% annual return” offer. It does not measure investment losses. |
| FINRA, Regulatory Notice 26-10 (Apr. 20, 2026) | Replaces the old day trading margin requirements, including the pattern day trader designation and the $25,000 minimum, with new intraday margin standards effective June 4, 2026. Firms may phase in until October 20, 2027. |
What we could not confirm: no official page we read prints an average investor return, an “average investor underperforms by X%” figure, or the share of day traders who lose money. The widely quoted DALBAR figures appeared on none of them, and DALBAR is a private firm. The fee figures are the SEC’s hypothetical examples, not real fund results. The SEC day-trading page is marked as modified in 2005 and its “Ask Questions” page in 2007, so we do not rely on them. Any text that still mentions the $25,000 pattern day trader minimum should be checked against Notice 26-10.
What to do
These are checks, not trades. Nothing here tells you what to buy or sell. Steps sorted by when they matter. Each one says how strong the evidence is: Measured Official advice Untested
Before
- Write down when you will need the money and how large a fall you could sit through without selling. Decide that before the market decides it for you. Untested
- If you use margin, know the terms: your broker may sell your holdings without asking you, you can lose more than you put in, and you are not owed extra time on a margin call. Official advice Investor.gov
- Check what your funds actually hold. The top ten S&P 500 holdings are 40.8% of the index, so three funds can mean the same ten companies three times. Measured see Sources
If it happens
- Look at the account before the headlines: any margin call, cash you need soon, positions you did not expect to hold. Untested
- Count trades as well as prices. The most active fifth of 66,465 households trailed the market by about 6.5 points a year, and the gap was cost. Measured see Sources
Afterwards
- Do the arithmetic: a 50% loss needs a 100% gain to get back to where you were. Measured see Sources
- Keep a short record of what you bought, why, and what would have made you sell. It is the only way to tell bad luck from a bad rule. Untested
What not to do
- Do not borrow to win a loss back. With margin, a further fall can be sold for you at the worst moment. Official advice Investor.gov
Step-by-step guide, with a printable checklist: After a big investment loss: what to check before you act
Not financial advice. How losses are taxed differs by country.
Questions people ask
Does this mean index funds are safe?
No, and nothing above says so. A broad index fund removes the risk that you picked the wrong companies. It does not remove the risk that the market falls. The S&P 500 lost roughly half its value between 2000 and 2002 and again between 2007 and 2009, and fell about 25% in 2022. What indexing changes is the shape of the risk: you take the market’s drawdowns instead of taking the market’s drawdowns plus the chance of holding one of the 11.8%.
Does holding for longer fix it?
For a diversified basket, a longer horizon has historically raised the probability of a positive outcome, though “historically” is doing real work in that sentence and the sample of independent long periods is small. For an individual stock, longer does not help in the same way. Bessembinder’s figures are lifetime returns — the entire listed life of each company, which is the longest horizon available. The 57.4% that failed to beat Treasury bills failed over their whole existence.
What about only buying high-quality, well-known companies?
The companies that ended at zero were not obscure at the time. They were listed, covered by analysts and held by institutions right up until they were not. Quality is judged in hindsight, and the list of what counted as a blue chip in 1999, 2007 or 2021 is not the list today. The recognisable names are exactly the ones a concentrated portfolio is most likely to contain, which is why Bessembinder’s distribution is not a story about penny stocks.
Is this different outside the United States?
The evidence points the same way in every market where somebody has been able to get the full records: Taiwan, Brazil, the Netherlands, India, the European Union. Costs, skew and overconfidence are not American phenomena. If anything the non-US retail studies are harsher, because leverage is more available.
So should I not invest at all?
That is not what any of this research concludes, and it is not what this article says. Holding cash has its own well-documented risk: inflation removes purchasing power quietly and without a statement showing a red number. The findings above are about the difference between owning a market and trying to beat it, and about the cost of activity. They are descriptive. What you do with them depends on facts about your own situation that no article can see.
The short version
- Only 42.6% of 25,967 US stocks beat one-month Treasury bills over their entire listed lives, 1926–2016. The most common single outcome was a loss of essentially 100%.
- Slightly more than 4% of listed companies account for the market’s entire $34.82 trillion of net wealth creation. Miss them and you get the other 96%.
- Across 66,465 US households, the most active fifth of traders trailed the market by about 6.5 percentage points a year. Their gross returns were normal; the gap was cost.
- In Taiwan’s full market record, fewer than 1% of day traders earned reliably positive returns net of fees. In Brazil, 97% of those who persisted past 300 days lost money.
- 86% of active US large-cap funds trailed the S&P 500 over ten years on SPIVA’s method. A 2026 critique using asset weighting and real index funds puts it at 55%. Both sponsors have a stake; the truth is somewhere in that range.
- The famous “investors lose 15% of their returns to bad timing” figure does not hold up. Corrected for a dollar-weighting artefact, the cost of mistimed buying and selling is about 0.10 percentage points a year.
- The top ten S&P 500 holdings are 40.8% of the index, above the dot-com peak of 26.6%. Owning three US funds may mean owning the same ten companies three times.
- A 50% loss needs a 100% gain to reverse. A 90% loss needs 900%. A 100% loss needs nothing that exists.
- 61% of investors aged 18–34 have acted on a social media personality’s recommendation. Social media users averaged 42% on an investment knowledge quiz while 63% rated their knowledge high.
This article describes published research on investment outcomes. It is general information, not investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security, fund or asset class. It cannot account for your income, tax position, time horizon, existing holdings or obligations. Past results in any of the studies cited do not predict future results. Anyone making decisions about their own money should speak to a licensed adviser in their own jurisdiction.
Further reading: A Random Walk Down Wall Street — Burton G. Malkiel (W. W. Norton, 13th edition 2023). The book-length version of the evidence above, updated across five decades. Its limitation is that it is an argument as well as a survey — Malkiel has held the same position since 1973 and reads the evidence in its favour — and it is written around US markets and US tax rules. Find it on Amazon (paid link)
On the links above: some are affiliate links, marked (paid link). If you buy through one we may earn a commission at no additional cost to you. As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases. We link to product searches rather than specific items so that recommendations do not break as models change, and we say plainly when we are choosing not to link something. Full policy: Affiliate Disclosure.
Sources
- Bessembinder, H., “Do stocks outperform Treasury bills?”, Journal of Financial Economics, 129(3), 2018, pp. 440–457. (25,967 CRSP common stocks, July 1926 to December 2016; 42.6% with lifetime buy-and-hold returns exceeding one-month Treasury bills; modal lifetime return a loss of essentially 100%, about 11.8% of stocks; $34.82 trillion of aggregate net wealth creation to December 2016; slightly more than 4% of firms accounting for all of it.)
- Barber, B.M. and Odean, T., “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors”, Journal of Finance, 55(2), 2000, pp. 773–806. (66,465 households at a US discount broker, January 1991 to January 1997; average household net annual return 16.4% against a market return of 17.9%; most active quintile by turnover 11.4% net; average annual turnover above 75%; monthly turnover of 21.49% in the top quintile; gross returns similar across turnover groups.)
- Barber, B.M., Lee, Y.-T., Liu, Y.-J. and Odean, T., “The Cross-Section of Speculator Skill: Evidence from Day Trading”, Journal of Financial Markets, 2014. (Complete Taiwan Stock Exchange records 1992–2006; about 450,000 individuals day trading annually; fewer than 1% able to predictably and reliably earn positive abnormal returns net of fees; top 500 traders 61.3 bps gross and 37.9 bps net daily, bottom performers 11.5 bps gross and −28.9 bps net.)
- Chague, F., De-Losso, R. and Giovannetti, B., “Day Trading for a Living?”, working paper, 2019 (SSRN 3423101). (All individuals beginning day trading in Brazilian equity index futures 2013–2015; 97% of those persisting beyond 300 days lost money; 1.1% earned more than the Brazilian minimum wage; 0.5% earned more than a bank teller’s starting salary.)
- S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Scorecard Mid-Year 2025, data to 30 June 2025. (All large-cap funds underperforming the S&P 500: 72.61% over one year, 85.98% over ten years, 88.29% over fifteen. All domestic funds against the S&P Composite 1500: 74.87% over one year, 90.31% over ten, 92.52% over fifteen. 54% underperformance in the first half of 2025 against 65% for full-year 2024.)
- Cremers, K.J.M., Fulkerson, J.A. and Riley, T.B., study sponsored by the Investment Adviser Association Active Managers Council, published May 2026. (Rebuilds the active-versus-passive comparison using asset weighting, credit for the period a fund existed rather than automatic underperformance on closure, and comparison against actual passive mutual funds; 55% of assets underperforming against SPIVA’s 92%, and 37% against 71% for fixed income.)
- Morningstar, Mind the Gap 2025, August 2025. (Ten years to 31 December 2024; aggregate fund total return 8.2% a year against an investor return of 7.0%, a gap of 1.2 percentage points or about 15% of total return; sector equity gap 1.5 percentage points, allocation funds 0.1 percentage points with roughly 97% of the fund return captured.)
- Fulkerson, J.A., Jordan, B.D., Riley, T.B. and Yan, Q., “Bad Timing Does Not Cost Investors 15% of Their Funds’ Returns: An Examination of Morningstar’s ‘Mind the Gap’ Study”, Financial Analysts Journal, 2026. (Estimates the cost of poor timing at approximately 0.10% a year, about one twelfth of the Morningstar figure, attributing the remainder to properties of the dollar-weighted return calculation.)
- J.P. Morgan Asset Management, “How extreme is market concentration?”, On the Minds of Investors, 20 May 2026. (Top ten S&P 500 holdings at 40.8% of index weight against a 26.6% technology-bubble peak; those holdings producing just over one third of index earnings.)
- FINRA Investor Education Foundation, research on the characteristics, behaviours and outcomes of retail investors who use social media, 2026. (60% of investors aged 18–34 using social media for investing information against 9% of those 55 or older; 61% against 6% having acted on a social media personality’s recommendation; social media users averaging 42% correct on an objective investment knowledge quiz while 63% rated their own knowledge high; 68% of social media users and 29% of non-users reporting money lost to fraud.)
- SEC behaviour bulletin; Library of Congress; SEC fees; SEC fund fees; FINRA; SEC allocation guide; FINRA Foundation; FINRA Notice 26-10.
